Toward a socio-economics of the brain drain and distributed human capital by Cañibano Sánchez, Carolina & Woolley, Richard Derle
Towards a Socio-Economics of the Brain
Drain and Distributed Human Capital
Carolina Cañibano* and Richard Woolley***
ABSTRACT
This paper derives from our joint interest in understanding how scientiﬁc mobility affects devel-
oping countries. Many authors have addressed the topic previously, both from an economic and
from a sociological perspective. However, recent literature evinces dissatisfaction with both
analytical frameworks and the framing of public policies addressing the brain drain problematic.
This paper is a contribution to understanding the historical and theoretical foundations of the
“brain drain” debate. We aim to improve conceptual clarity regarding the itinerancy of human
beings and the mobilization of human capital. We develop a critical review of the economics of
the brain drain, highlighting the work of some key early thinkers and pointing out the way in
which subsequent work has taken up selected aspects of their approaches leaving other chal-
lenges aside. We then consider the diaspora networks literature, which is characterized as taking
a “connectionist” approach to the brain drain. We identify two fundamental problems: the side-
lining of complementarity and context dependency as basic properties of human capital; and a
failure to adequately disentangle the concepts of human resources for science and technology
(HRST) and human capital in academic and policy discourse about the brain drain.
INTRODUCTION
Scientiﬁc discovery and knowledge diffusion have been associated with the itinerancy of scientists
and scholars since the beginning of written history. In the modern era, ﬂows of scientists and intel-
lectuals increased after the Second World War, during the subsequent Cold War and the last dec-
ades of the twentieth century, linked to the social, economic and political disparities between
countries and the development of systems of mass long-distance transportation (US House of Rep-
resentatives, 1977). A prominent framing of contemporary global intellectual itinerancy is that
which has been labelled the “brain drain”.
An early use of the term “brain drain” was in reference to the exodus of British scientists to the
United States (USA) in the 1960s (US House of Representatives, Committee on International Rela-
tions, 1977), apparently denoting a permanent knowledge and welfare loss suffered by the sending
country in such circumstances. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the bases of human capital theory in eco-
nomics were being laid down around the same time, with Theodore Schultz publishing his ﬁrst
reﬂections on the role of education and human capital formation in economic development (1961,
1963) and Gary Becker his theory of human capital (1964). While economists were designing a
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theory addressing the crucial role that the accumulation of embodied knowledge plays in economic
development, politicians and policymakers were becoming increasingly concerned about potential
deleterious consequences associated with the emigration of the highly skilled. This concern contin-
ues today. Voices from Africa and Latin America describe the damaging effects that the brain drain
has on their societies.1 This discourse also remains prominent in Eastern and Southern European
countries, such as Poland (Ackers, 2009) and Italy (Morano-Foadi, 2006). Brain drain has also been
identiﬁed as a signiﬁcant issue, and ameliorated via innovative policy strategies, in both North-East
and South-East Asia (Krishna and Khadria, 1997; Song, 1997; Zweig, 2007). However, despite sus-
tained attention on the issue, discontent remains regarding both analytical frameworks and public
policy (Gaillard and Gaillard, 2003; Skeldon, 2009).
In this paper, we argue that the persistence of the brain drain problematic, whilst obviously lar-
gely due to uneven socio-economic and scientiﬁc development, is also partly due to the failure to
resolve certain theoretical issues that frame policy thinking. As we see it, the most fundamental
problem is the conceptual conﬂation of the demographic category of skilled human resources for
science and technology (HRST) and the economic concept of human capital (HC). Despite being
obviously closely related and intertwined empirically, they belong to distinct ontological registers.
However, most work on the brain drain tends to conﬂate the two, leading to a situation in which
human capital is conceived as bounded and enclosed by an individual body. Of course, this con-
ceptual conﬂation is not unique to studies of the brain drain. However, we consider it particularly
troublesome in relation to the brain drain problematic due to its methodological “convenience”,
which over time has framed analysis in particular ways.
To illustrate our claims, in this paper we take a genealogical approach to the foundations of the
economics of the brain drain debate. We will show that in the early debate regarding the brain
drain in the 1960s, human capital was not treated as an easily divisible and “countable” category.
We point out how subsequent work has taken up selected aspects that can be more easily assimi-
lated to general equilibrium economic assumptions and calculative techniques.
We then consider literature in which attempts have been made to develop an alternative approach
to the brain drain problematic in the space left by the methodological enclosing of economic analy-
ses. According to Favell et al. (2007: 19), the orthodox brain drain debate has largely failed to
account for “the frequent back and forth movement of migrants, ideas, knowledge, information, and
skill sets that is now a routine part of contemporary transnationalism”. Alternative approaches have
emerged that consider these processes on the receiving side; for example, from perspectives of
knowledge transactions (Williams, 2007) or innovation systems (Hart, 2007). However, work
addressing the key brain drain problematic – the nature, value, scale and scope of beneﬁts to coun-
tries of emigration – has largely stagnated since Meyer and colleagues developed their “diaspora
knowledge network” approach more than a decade and a half ago. We take another look at this
“connectionist” approach, arguing that in its theoretical critique of the neoclassical economics of the
brain drain, it has much in common with the “lost fundamentals” of the early economics debate.
However, we also suggest that their empirically derived descriptions of transnational spaces of cir-
culation, organized around cultural/national identiﬁcation, are not then translated into a conceptual
approach to distributed human capital. This leads to the ﬁnal section of the paper, in which we pro-
pose a broad agenda for reinvigorated scholarship directed at the problematic of the brain drain.
THE ECONOMICS OF THE BRAIN DRAIN: THE 1960S DEBATE
The ﬁrst academic debate concerning the brain drain opposed two views of the consequences of
scientiﬁc migration phenomenon: the so-called “nationalist” and “internationalist” models. Harry
Johnson provided the touchstone for the internationalist model. He was one of the ﬁrst authors to
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discuss “the economics of the brain drain”, pointing out that the term “drain” conveyed a strong
implication of serious loss (Johnson, 1965). The questions to be addressed were therefore “to
whom does the loss occur and what sort of loss is it?” Clearly the loss does not affect “the brains
that are being drained” (Johnson, 1965: 299). In fact, Schultz (1961) had earlier considered migra-
tion as a form of an individual’s investment in human capital. The loss derived from migration
would thus affect those who continued to reside in the country of origin.
Johnson (1965: 300) connected concern about outward migration with “the philosophy of eco-
nomic nationalism” and proposed an alternative “internationalist model” (Johnson, 1968), which
considered the potential beneﬁts of the outﬂow of the highly skilled, both for the home country
and the world economy. He criticized policymakers’ automatic association of outﬂows with
“drains”, concluding that the variety of potential gains and losses to the world economy as a whole,
and to sending and receiving economies, did not allow for such simplistic interpretations. In con-
trast, authors such as Boulding (1968) and Patinkin (1968) argued the importance of human capital
for national economies and the potential dangers of emigration from developing countries.
The debate was set, overall, within a broad conceptual framework reﬂecting the complexity of
the phenomenon under study. Johnson found more reasons to be optimistic about the ﬁnal welfare
creation and distribution effects of the brain drain, whereas Boulding (1968), Kidd (1965) and Pat-
inkin (1968) placed more emphasis on the potential negative consequences for developing econo-
mies. The main arguments sustaining the views of these authors are summarized in Table 1.
A certain conception of human capital can be argued to underlie the statements in Table 1. This
conception contains several key elements structuring the analytical reﬂections of these authors:
• individuals are heterogeneous, interconnected, interdependent, face uncertainty, and are
embedded in temporality;
• the productivity and value of human capital varies depending on the social and economic
context of its use; and
• factors of production are complementary.
It is perhaps unsurprising that such assumptions can be found in the 1960s brain drain debate,
given the close involvement of Kenneth Boulding, considered to be one of the fathers of evolution-
ary economics (Boulding, 1981). These fundamental assumptions have much in common with
thinking in contemporary evolutionary economics.2 As such, they differ markedly from those of the
neoclassical equilibrium approach that was to become increasingly dominant from the 1960s.
Boulding developed a comprehensive body of economic theory, which moved away from Newto-
nian mechanics analogies and therefore from the general equilibrium paradigm that forms the base
for what is commonly known as “standard” or “mainstream” economics. Instead, Boulding’s eco-
nomic theory was explicitly inspired by the biological sciences (Boulding, 1981: 25).
When addressing the brain drain phenomenon, Boulding (1968) starts by insisting on the greater
importance of human compared to physical capital for economic development: “Physical capital is
merely human knowledge imposed on the physical world” but “it is not the existing stock of
knowledge in a society which determines its rate of development as much as its capacity for learn-
ing” (Boulding, 1968: 112–113). For Boulding,
… human capital even more than physical capital is a structure, rather than an aggregate. We do
not necessarily increase the productive capacity of a society by adding another person to it, even if
he is very expensively trained, if that person does not ﬁt into the matrix of information ﬂows in a
way that increases the productivity of the society. (1968: 113)
The problem of economic development is for Boulding (1966, 1973, 1991 [1956]) – as for Hay-
ek (1945) – mainly one of organization of knowledge in society. His conception of the world as
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system brings him to stress the connections between the different factors contributing to production
processes, of which know-how and learning are of major importance. His focus on the dynamic
and interactive dimension of the system contrasts with the mechanical models involving constant
parameters relied on by mainstream economics (Boulding, 1981). Consider the argument supported
by Kidd (1965) and Patinkin (1968) – N.5 in Table 1 – that the movement of a few scientists and
engineers can cripple and destroy a ﬁeld or a department in less developed countries (see Table 1).
As Boulding implies, a few scientists may play crucial roles in social structures (as educators or
leaders) that might be broken into disparate parts if they migrate. In this context, actors are con-
nected and complement each other. It is therefore not the number of emigrants that is crucial, but
where they are integrated into the human capital structure.
We might also recall Johnson’s (1968: 74) statement I.4 (Table 1). Johnson argues that the
migrant might ﬁt better into a production structure in a country of migration than in the country of
origin. It is wrong to assume that their role was crucial in the home country. Rather, it is how the
TABLE 1
TWO VISIONS OF THE BRAIN DRAIN: THE 1960S DEBATE IN ECONOMICS
Nationalist–pessimistic Internationalist–optimistic
N.1. If education is ﬁnanced by general taxation of
the resident population, every educated migrant
takes with him a gift from the place he leaves to
the place to which he goes (Boulding, 1968;
Johnson, 1965).
I.1. Migrants from developing countries frequently
maintain their family ties and send remittances,
which may compensate for the eventual losses
(Boulding, 1968; Johnson, 1965, 1968).
N.2. Accumulation of human capital generates
economies of scale, which are lost as a
consequence of emigration (Johnson, 1965).
I.2. Migrants may also return, letting the home
country beneﬁt from the learning and skills
acquired abroad. New ideas and discoveries
are frequently generated by the confrontation
of an individual with a new and different culture
(Boulding, 1965, 1968).
N.3. Exporting skilled trained adults implies a loss
of learning capacity and therefore of growth
potential for the sending society (Boulding, 1968).
I.3. Migration frequently acts as a liberating force,
freeing the human mind for creative work that it
would not otherwise produce (Johnson, 1965).
N.4. Highly skilled human resources perform
important social functions that are not captured
by market prices and salaries (these are therefore
considered as “externalities” within economic
analysis), such as teaching and mentoring,
inspirational and leadership qualities, institutional
entrepreneurship and so on. These functions are
particularly crucial in less developed countries
(Boulding, 1968; Johnson, 1965, 1968; Kidd,
1965; Patinkin, 1968).
I.4. Skills embodied in human capital are
complementary to other inputs into research or
production. It is too easy to assume wrongly that
the migrant would have made the same or a
comparable contribution to research or to national
income in the country from which he migrates
(Johnson, 1968).
N.5. The movement of a few scientists and
engineers can cripple and destroy a ﬁeld or
a department in less developed countries
(Kidd, 1965, Patinkin, 1968).
I.5. The services of emigrants are available to a
region if they are needed to the extent that the
region is prepared to pay for them, especially
given the cheapness of modern transportation
(Johnson, 1965).
N.6. Science and technology must be adapted
for and in less developed countries if they
are to be useful for economic development:
much research done on applied problems in
one environment is not transferable to
another (Kidd, 1965).
I.6. Discoveries from basic scientiﬁc research
beneﬁt the world as a whole, including the home
country of scientists who have emigrated
(Johnson, 1965).
I.7. Emigrants can inﬂuence policies in their new
country of residence towards their native country
(Johnson, 1965).
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location of individuals conﬁgures, or reconﬁgures, particular human capital structures that is deci-
sive. Migrants may return, or establish connections from abroad; in either case, the associated
reconﬁguration of human capital structures could potentially entail socio-economic beneﬁt.
According to this analytical framework, heterogeneous contexts (different roles, connections and
the ﬁt to the productive structures) and complementarity (between production factors and social and
economic structures) are key elements for understanding the varied consequences of geographical
ﬂows of highly skilled scientists and engineers. Human capital is understood as entering a speciﬁc pro-
duction structure in which it needs to ﬁt. This implies, for example, that an economy cannot be deﬁned
or evaluated in terms of the number of biologists it contains. To assess the value derived from having
biologists, there is a need to study what, if any, role they play in social and productive structures.
As this overview suggests, aspects of the 1960s brain drain debate were conceptually sophisti-
cated and considered human capital to be distributed, characterizing this in terms of the connectiv-
ity and complementarity between individuals in forming productive structures. However, despite
the broadness of this initial debate, the subsequent economic models that assessed the role of the
brain drain in economic development followed a conceptually and methodologically “standard” tra-
dition, relying on neoclassical equilibrium premises. In the following section, we describe the major
assumptions and contributions of this neoclassical economics of the brain drain.
THE NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS OF THE BRAIN DRAIN
In contrast to the diversity of the economic debate on the brain drain of the 1960s, our review
found that subsequent approaches to the brain drain have been predominantly built on the assump-
tions of general equilibrium economics and standard human capital theory. General equilibrium
models rely on the concept of homogeneous representative agents. An individual with a certain
accumulation of human capital, deﬁned in terms of years of schooling or experience, is representa-
tive of any other individual with the same level. Individuals are autonomous and respond to market
signals when making decisions about investments in education and their professional choices,
including migration.
The basic neoclassical model for homogeneous labour
The conceptual starting point is a market that operates in perfect competition and in which workers
earn an income that is equal to their marginal product. Differences in skills or human capital
endowments of workers are not yet considered: any worker is a perfect substitute for any other in
the economy. All agents have perfect information about market prices and automatically respond to
changes. Labour markets adjust to the equilibrium levels of supply and demand assuring full
employment. A person leaving the productive system would not harm the national economy, as she
would only take away the value of her marginal product, which she herself earns anyway.3 The
departure of a person could even raise the nation’s capital/labour ratio (Grubel and Scott, 1966).
The assumption of diminishing returns to scale in the use of labour implies that emigration will
raise per capita income if the endowments of all other factors of production remain constant
(Bhagwati and Rodriguez, 1975).
The basic brain drain framework (with heterogeneous labour)
To assess the effect of the emigration of the highly skilled, the above assumptions are changed.
Workers are considered to be endowed with different levels of human capital, which implies the rec-
ognition of certain market inefﬁciencies. This is due to the particular characteristics of human capital
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compared to other production factors. According to Becker (1993 [1964]: 312), “knowledge is not
subject to diminishing returns in the same way as is physical capital because greater knowledge
raises the productivity of further investment in knowledge”. The increasing returns of human capital
imply that the rate of return on human capital grows as the stock of human capital increases.
Economies of scale are therefore associated with the accumulation of human capital in the econ-
omy. External economies also appear, as highly skilled persons have the capacity not only to
increase their own productivity, but also to encourage the productivity of other agents.4 The social
product of skilled persons is therefore higher than their marginal product. The inefﬁciency relies on
the fact that the market that rewards skilled individuals with an income equivalent to their marginal
product fails to compensate them for their contribution to society. The market thus fails to provide
an optimum level of investment in human capital because social beneﬁts of this investment are
higher than private ones. This failure is normally addressed through governmental investment in
education.
Some implications of the above premises are as follows: (i) skilled individuals will be attracted
to locations with high stocks of human capital and therefore higher returns to their accumulated
skills;5 (ii) skilled emigrants take not only their marginal product with them but also their social
product; and (iii) if skilled emigrants’ education was ﬁnanced by the government, then emigrants
fail to repay this investment through their contribution to the tax system.
It follows that low-income countries will suffer the consequences of net welfare losses associated
with the departure of skilled individuals. The net losses will be especially high if the government
funds education, as is normally the case.
Returning to the questions posed by Johnson (1965) (to whom does the loss occur and what sort
of loss is it?), we may summarize the implications of the above basic framework by pointing out
that the particular economic properties of human capital, and the fact that the market fails to allo-
cate it efﬁciently, imply that emigration of skilled individuals has a negative effect on the home
economies, as they lose their investments in education and the productive potential of the emigrated
capital. This would justify why an outﬂow tends to be automatically considered as “a drain”. From
the 1970s, the economic debate on the brain drain revolved around discussion of this basic frame-
work and its effects. Below, we review the principal arguments that have contributed to this debate.
First, we focus on the discussion of losses (drains) and, second, we review the discussion on the
potential gains that have also been linked to skilled emigration.
Discussing the basic brain drain framework
Grubel and Scott (1966) start from the basic model, but argue that losses associated with skilled
emigration are normally only temporary. In the long run, economies will adapt to frictional inefﬁ-
ciencies associated with skilled migration. Other skilled workers will replace emigrants (Grubel and
Scott, 1966: 271). In relation to the loss of public investment in education, these authors argue that
emigrants take along their contribution to tax revenue, but also their children, on whom this share
of revenue would have been spent. According to Grubel and Scott, the losses that a country suffers
due to skilled emigration are not as great as the basic brain drain model would suggest.6
Bhagwati and colleagues challenged this optimistic outlook, which supported Johnson’s “interna-
tionalist view”. Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) acknowledged the possible losses of skilled emigra-
tion described, focusing on additional factors that may cause welfare losses in sending/developing
countries. In Bhagwati and Dellalfar (1973), Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), Bhagwati and Rodrí-
guez (1975) and Bhagwati (1979), the assumption of perfectly competitive labour markets is
removed. Wages respond to market forces, but also to other factors. According to these models, in
developing countries the salary levels of the educated elites tend to imitate the wages of compara-
ble groups in more developed countries, reaching a level above the equilibrium market price and
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encouraging unemployment among the educated. The high salary levels encourage the demand for
education, which in turn may accentuate skilled unemployment if wages do not react to the higher
supply of skills in the economy and remain high. Additionally, the wages of the unskilled tend to
be pulled up by the highest wages, also encouraging unskilled unemployment. In these models,
migration of skilled manpower leads to a distortion of salary levels, encouraging general unemploy-
ment and an overexpansion of educational facilities (Bhagwati and Dellalfar, 1973). Additionally,
the possibility of migration inhibits the internal diffusion of skills. Bhagwati (1979: 20) illustrates
this phenomenon (“brain waste”) with the example of a Filipino doctor working as a cab driver in
Manila while he awaits the opportunity to pass an examination to migrate to the USA, instead of
starting medical practice in his own country.
In summary, these authors conclude that skilled emigration from developing countries entails
important losses for the sending economies that go far beyond the consequences of frictional tem-
porary adjustments. This results in higher levels of public expenditures and lower welfare. More
recent models have supported these conclusions. Wong and Yip (1999) build a model in which
growth is endogenously determined by human capital accumulation and reduced by the human cap-
ital loss that follows migration. Pieretti and Zou (2009) challenge Grubel and Scott (1966) by
focusing on the effects on per-capita income of different grades of substitutability between skilled
and unskilled labour. Another possible negative effect follows from changes in the composition of
human capital in sending countries. Different paths of development require different types of skills.
Migration prospects may distort the agents’ incentives to accumulate the most appropriate skills for
their country of origin, which reduces growth rates (Di Maria and Stryszowski, 2009). However,
“modern brain drain theory” (Glytsos, 2009) challenges these conclusions by adding new dimen-
sions to the analysis, arguing that they turn the “brain drain” into a beneﬁcial phenomenon, an
argument to which we now turn.
The beneﬁcial brain drain, or brain gain
Alternative models to those described in the previous section argue that the overall impact of the
brain drain is eventually beneﬁcial due to internal dynamics. The important argument here is that
the prospect of migration raises the expected potential returns on education and encourages workers
to invest more in human capital (Stark et al., 1998). This raises the average level of human capital
and the productivity levels of the economy (Stark, 2004).
The positive effects of the prospect of migration on human capital accumulation and productivity
of the sending countries have been also addressed by Beine et al. (2001, 2008), Easterly and Ny-
arko, (2008), Kapur and McHale (2005), Mountford (1997) and Solimanos (2008). Beine et al.
(2008) conduct an empirical analysis of 127 developing countries, estimating brain drain and gain
effects. They conclude that, from a global perspective, the beneﬁts to major gaining countries such
as China, India and Brazil outweigh the losers’ losses. These recent studies refer to this phenome-
non as beneﬁcial brain drain or brain gain. Methodologically, these studies retain the assumptions
of the prior neoclassical models and general equilibrium theory and, as pointed out above, they
consider the changes in expected returns on education that the possibility of migration entails. The
elements that these studies have added to the 1960s discussion are summarized in Table 2.
ASSESSING THE ECONOMICS OF THE BRAIN DRAIN: LOST FUNDAMENTALS
AND AGGREGATIVE PUBLIC POLICIES
There are fundamental reasons why Tables 1 and 2 should not be merged. As pointed out earlier,
the 1960s discussion summarized in Table 1 was not enclosed by general equilibrium assumptions
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and, instead, assumed interconnection and complementarity among agents and production factors.
In contrast, the general equilibrium–based brain drain models provide formal descriptions of human
capital accumulation (or un-accumulation) dynamics, in a context in which connectivity and com-
plementarity are not integrated. Economic growth and welfare automatically beneﬁt from the aggre-
gation of human capital units, which are accumulated through the training of new people within
the national education system and their incorporation to the labour force or through immigration. In
turn, human capital is mainly lost through emigration, retirement or mortality of skilled personnel.
The neoclassical brain drain models discussed reach different conclusions depending on which
elements of these aggregative dynamics are emphasized. For example, in Bhagwati (1979), the emi-
gration prospect discourages highly skilled persons from looking for a job in their home country,
leading to brain drain and un/under-employment – a net human capital loss. Alternatively, in Beine
et al. (2001, 2008), the emigration prospect encourages more persons to get tertiary level educa-
tion: some of those people will then remain in the national labour force – a potential net gain in
human capital.
From a policy perspective, the implications of such analyses are quite straightforward. An econ-
omy or a scientiﬁc system should maximize the number of highly qualiﬁed and skilled individuals
as a proxy for the accumulation of human capital. The precise policy strategies adopted to achieve
maximization would depend on the particular aggregative model considered. For example, where
emigration prospects are assumed to encourage human capital formation, the ideal level of emigra-
tion might not be nil.
In Europe, a compatible policy approach has indeed emerged, promoting three main actions to
achieve the accumulation objective: to train, to retain and to attract human capital (including attract-
ing emigrants to return). The document that sets the bases for the formation of the European
Research Area (CEC, 2000) clearly states that Europe suffers a brain drain (mainly to the USA)
and sets the objectives of “attracting the best researchers from all over the world … and encourag-
ing the return to European laboratories of researchers who have left” (CEC, 2000: 19). The “train,
retain, attract” policy strategy has recently been restated by the European Commission (CEC, 2007:
10), but it has been enriched by other approaches to which we will later refer.
Numerous examples may also be found of policies in developing countries where “train” and
“attract back” rationales predominate. In China, overseas PhD support funded by the Chinese
Scholarship Committee normally requires the recipient to return to China to work for 2 years fol-
TABLE 2
BRAIN DRAIN AND DEVELOPMENT: THE “MAINSTREAM” DEBATE
Nationalist–pessimistic (2) Internationalist–optimistic (2)
The salary levels of the highly skilled in developed
countries encourage an increase of wages in
developing countries, inducing unemployment
and an overexpansion of educational facilities
(Bhagwati and Dellalfar, 1973).
The losses that a country suffers from skilled
emigration are only temporary and frictional.
In the long term, the economy will adapt to
changes or to a certain migration rate (Grubel
and Scott, 1966).
Migration prospects inhibit the internal diffusion of
accumulated skills in developing countries
(Bhagwati, 1979).
The prospect of migration encourages the
formation of human capital, which may
compensate for the loss caused by emigration
(see, e.g., Beine et al., 2001, 2008; Easterly
and Nyarko, 2008; Mountford, 1997; Stark,
2003; Stark et al., 1998).
Emigration reduces the endogenous growth capacity
of the economy (Wong and Yip, 1999).
Emigration prospects encourage a change of skill
composition that may harm sending countries’
economies (Di Maria and Stryszowski, 2009).
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lowing completion of their doctorate abroad. Such conditionality of international research training
grants has been a common practice in Latin American countries – in Peru, for example, where the
brain outﬂow increases while publicly funded opportunities to train abroad remain vacant due to
the lack of opportunities to ﬁnd a job in the country after compulsory return (Portillo, 2010). The
limited success of this type of programme has been acknowledged (Villanueva, 2009). Claims have
emerged for multifaceted policies in developing countries that go beyond “classical programmes”
aimed at preventing outﬂows and encouraging the return and reintegration of emigrated specialized
human capital (Tuirán, 2009). We will return to the policy debate later. These examples aim simply
to illustrate the inﬂuence of the neoclassical economics of the brain drain and its aggregative
approach.
In contrast, as was discussed earlier, the bases for a different vision, which were laid out on the
eve of the brain drain debate, have had little apparent inﬂuence. Boulding’s (1968) description of
human capital as a “structure” that resists aggregation is admittedly a methodologically challenging
conception. As Loasby (2008: 50) describes,
[e]ach individual and each established connection between individuals may be regarded as a bearer
of capital, but the effectiveness of each unit of capital depends on the structure in which it is
embedded.
Loasby stresses the fact that human capital is not reducible to isolated individuals, and that its
value depends on the structure of differentiated complementary and context dependent elements in
which it is mobilized. Here, it seems that the thinking that reﬂected Boulding’s earlier description
of human capital has re-emerged in economics discourse after a prolonged hiatus.
The lost fundamentals of complementarity and context have allowed economic thinking about
the brain drain to be restricted to aggregative analyses, which we believe, are based on a simple
conﬂation of HRST and human capital. If human capital is assumed to be embedded in individuals,
without connecting its value or potential to the context in which it is mobilized, then calculating
human capital can be simply equated to counting individuals. As we have outlined, this has been
particularly important due to the inﬂuence of economic analyses in framing policy formation. How-
ever, these apparent limitations of the mainstream economics approach to the brain drain problem-
atic have also opened space for literature that challenges fundamental neoclassical assumptions
about human capital and emphasizes neglected social and connectionist elements. It is to this litera-
ture that we now turn.
THE (RE-)CONNECTIVE DIMENSION: DIASPORA NETWORKS
The conceptual limitations of the neoclassical economics of the brain drain have been challenged
by Meyer and colleagues in their work on scientiﬁc diasporas (see Meyer, 2001, 2003; Meyer and
Brown, 1999; Meyer and Charum, 1995). The stated motivation for this work was the failure of
policies based on the neoclassical approach – that is, retain, attract, return – to regulate ﬂows of
the highly skilled or reduce the negative impacts on developing countries (Meyer, 2001; Meyer and
Brown, 1999).
According to these authors, the policy problem follows from a theoretical failure to properly con-
ceptualize human capital in general and, in particular, human capital devoted to scientiﬁc and tech-
nological activities. Meyer (2001: 95) argues that “brain drain approaches are semantically and
historically associated” with “the human capital paradigm”, referring to the theoretical framework
described in this paper as the neoclassical economics of the brain drain. This paradigm is character-
ized by a “substantialist view of skills as a stock of knowledge and/or abilities embedded in the
individual” (Meyer, 2001: 95). Human capital is conceived as discrete and accumulated during spe-
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ciﬁc periods of life (e.g. education), a conception that does not differentiate between human and
physical capital (Meyer et al., 2001). The individual is conceived as a mere human capital asset
(Meyer and Brown, 1999), technically independent from other economic agents and free to respond
to market signals (Meyer, 2001).
Meyer and Charum (1995) stress the unreality of a theoretical world characterized by fundamen-
tal homogeneity, instantaneity and isolation of economic agents. Meyer and colleagues draw on sci-
ence and technology studies that demonstrate the collective and distributed nature of cognitive
frameworks, communities of practice and technical skills in highly complex ﬁelds such as scientiﬁc
research and engineering. According to Meyer, “these approaches … present individuals as being
involved in knowledge-intensive activities, deeply rooted in their networks, with their own skills
being historically and physically contextualised” (2001: 96).
The basic conceptual shift proposed thus consists of considering the “relational dimension of
skills, which is inherent to their development as well as to their application” (Meyer, 2001: 95).
Individuals are considered to be embedded in time and space and interconnected in various ways.
Hence, the value and effectiveness of human capital depend on the complementarity of the human
capital assembled in collectives of skilled individuals, and how it relates to other resources, includ-
ing infrastructure (physical capital) (Meyer and Brown, 1999) and institutions (Meyer and Watti-
aux, 2006). Human capital is therefore (re)deﬁned as contextual and relational/connected. Meyer
and colleagues refer to their own approach as being “connective”; we would argue that the under-
developed signiﬁcance of their thinking is that it points towards a theory of human capital under-
stood as distributed rather than aggregated.
The reader will detect strong similarities between this approach and the list of “key structuring
elements” characterizing the early economic debate on the brain drain in the 1960s. In fact, these
authors are reintroducing fundamental ideas concerning the nature of human capital devoted to sci-
entiﬁc activities that were already present in the early debate on the brain drain. Let us recall here
that, for Boulding, Johnson or Kidd, the contextual, temporal, relational and complementary nature
of human capital were the grounds on which they built their arguments regarding the brain drain.
In this sense, we may talk of an interesting historical theoretical “loop” concerning the brain drain
that has the particularity of being interdisciplinary.
Meyer and colleagues developed their connectionist approach through empirical investigations,
notably observations of “scientiﬁc diasporas” (Barré et al., 2003) or “diaspora knowledge net-
works” (DKNs) (Meyer et al., 2001) as a subset of the transnational organization of scientiﬁc work.
DKNs organized around national or cultural identiﬁcation, such as Red CALDAS (Columbia), were
found to “contribute to the development of their members’ place of origin through their skill input”
(Meyer and Wattiaux, 2006: 5). DKNs were observed to be a mechanism for ongoing beneﬁts from
national investments in highly skilled human capital, subsequently located offshore, to ﬂow back to
the “home” system in various ways. Subsequently, it was argued that the DKNs’ approach “sub-
verts the traditional ‘brain drain’ migration outﬂow into a ‘brain gain’ skills circulation by convert-
ing the loss of human resources into a remote although accessible asset of expanded networks”
(Meyer and Wattiaux, 2006: 5).
This alternative interpretation of mobility has inﬂuenced policy programmes in several countries,
which have put the stress on the “re-linking”, instead of the return, of expatriate talents in the inter-
ests of capturing beneﬁts from human capital (Didou-Aupetit, 2009). Since the 1990s, programmes
to encourage the organization of scientiﬁc diasporas have proliferated, including RAICES in Argen-
tina, Chileglobal in Chile, ANA in Nigeria and ATPER in Thailand.7 Despite the apparent prolifer-
ation of this type of network, a “diaspora effect” contributing to scientiﬁc and technical
development in the countries of origin has been put into question (Gaillard and Gaillard, 2003).
From our perspective, there does appear to be a gap between, on the one hand, a critique of the
theoretical discourse of standard human capital theory, which points out the relational dimension of
skills and rejects the isolationist ontology of self-contained units of human capital bounded by indi-
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vidual human bodies and, on the other hand, empirical evidence of connections among individuals
and networks of individuals (HRST). The use of “network” in DKN research does seem to fall
back into an identiﬁcation of connections between individuals as constitutive of spaces of commu-
nication and circulation. Meanwhile, the notion of human capital as distributed rather than allocated
recedes from view. Unlike the conﬂation of human capital and HRST within the neoclassical eco-
nomics of the brain drain, the DKN literature separates the two concepts, but then fails to conceive
of theoretical implications in the ontological realm of human capital that might have been provoked
by delineation of transnational networks of the highly skilled.
This is not to suggest that the DKN literature does not make an important contribution. There
are theoretical and pragmatic difﬁculties inscribed in trying to develop a dialogue between a con-
ception of distributed human capital, characterized by complementarity and context dependence,
and the problematic of “gains” and “drains” of HRST between different places – particularly mobil-
ity from the developing world to the developed. The key insight that we draw from the DKN litera-
ture in relation to the problematic of the brain drain is that the mobility of human resources, in all
likelihood (although not necessarily), reconﬁgures distributions of human capital. That such recon-
ﬁgurations may be productive or destructive in their effects is contingent and requires empirical
investigation, interpretation and analyses within a theoretical framework that remains, as yet,
undeveloped.
The DKN literature has been inﬂuential nevertheless. Policymakers now seek an optimum combi-
nation of the “aggregative” and the “connectionist” in their policy mix (Villanueva, 2009). The EU
put stress on the “train, retain, attract” policy approach only some years ago, but has recently incor-
porated the connectionist policy discourse by recognizing the value of European researchers work-
ing in the USA and the need to build links with them (CEC, 2005).8 Many of the newly
industrialized countries in the Asian region have long recognized the value of “offshore” stocks of
human capital (diasporas) (Saxenian, 2005; Song, 1997). Importantly, many policies in the Asian
region now target short-term or temporary stays to enable “home” countries to leverage knowledge
and learning from their offshore nationals. The freedom to continue to circulate professionally and
maintain concurrent commitments overseas has also been a particularly crucial factor in encourag-
ing the contribution of foreign-based scientists in the case of China (Zweig, 2007). The contempo-
rary policy mix thus seeks to combine a competitive “war for talent” (Kapur and McHale, 2005)
rationale with a collaborative connectionist approach designed to leverage human capital located
offshore. An expansion in the theoretical framing of the brain drain and subsequent diversiﬁcation
of policy design can therefore be discerned.
However, many of the limitations of contemporary approaches remain relatively unchanged since
Boulding’s 1960s argument. The concepts of human capital and HRST are largely entangled and
interchangeable in discourse. The conﬁguring of human capital by its context, its location within
the “matrix of information ﬂows” and hence its potential for adaptation and evolution has been
eclipsed by the accounting for stocks and ﬂows of researchers and, more recently, identifying con-
nections between them. The challenge for theory beyond the economics of the brain drain is thus
precisely to be able to describe the complex dynamics of human capital mobilization and distribu-
tion, without being again seduced by the relatively straightforward visibility and calculability of
units and aggregates of human resources.
TOWARDS A SOCIO-ECONOMICS OF DISTRIBUTED HUMAN CAPITAL
Our major undertaking in this paper was a review of contributions made by the early thinkers on
the brain drain. We have pointed out that fundamental elements of the early debate, speciﬁcally the
complementarity and context dependency of human capital, were subsequently lost. This allowed
the economics of the brain drain to become enclosed for almost four decades within the legacy of
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mechanical thinking (Dopfer, 2005). The mechanistic paradigm, by assuming the independence of
economic agents, treats the contribution of human capital – and therefore its economic value – as
almost constant regardless of the context in which it is applied and of the other entities to which it
relates. Only the concept of externalities allows a very limited consideration of its social effects.
Accumulation of human capital is then the dynamic that matters.
We pointed out the conﬂation of the category of HRST and the concept of human capital,
enabling economic calculations in which individuals and human capital are effectively equivalent
units. The subsequent emergence of technically sophisticated models and calculations that charac-
terize mainstream economic analyses of the brain drain then demonstrates the utility of the
approach. By measuring the dynamics of the allocation of human capital using the proxy of move-
ments of persons across national frontiers, a calculable object is forged, entrenching the power and
persuasiveness of a particular analytical paradigm. We would argue that the seductiveness of com-
plex calculations in buttressing the mechanistic paradigm has much to do with the way in which
the brain drain problematic has been framed and “managed” in recent decades.
Such an approach could perhaps be justiﬁed if it was explicitly argued that human resources
and human capital were interchangeable, and that no “extra-individual” attributions could be
attached to human capital. However, quite the opposite is the case. Our review of the early debate
in economics and of Meyer and colleagues’ arguments suggest an alternative formulation of the
contribution of human capital to social and economic development, in which both the complemen-
tarity of heterogeneous human capital and the contexts of its use are emphasized. Human capital
would be addressed from a systemic perspective that considers its interdependencies with other
production factors and its changing and dynamic role in economic and social structures. Human
capital should not be conceptualized as an aggregate (like HRST) but as distributed across hetero-
geneous structures embedded in time and space; variably context dependent and therefore not
automatically transferable; and complementary to other assets that make it valuable. A theory built
around these fundamentals would reframe the study of HRST mobility by focusing on the alter-
ation of human capital structures it may induce, without assuming a priori any aggregative or loss
effects.
Understood this way, the exercise of calculating national allocations of highly skilled HRST is
of only limited use in understanding the dynamics of mobilization of human capital for scientiﬁc
research and socio-economic development; activities that are complex, collective and organized
across and beyond national frontiers. Crucially, the utility of human capital for any potential ben-
eﬁciary is not necessarily delimited by the geographical location of individuals, collectives or
parts thereof. However, whilst it has been relatively straightforward to calculate national stocks
and net ﬂows of human resources as if they were the outcome of consistent market processes, it
appears extremely challenging to map distributions of human capital mobilized for the production
and/or use of knowledge, to understand how these structures are reconﬁgured by HRST mobility,
and to calculate what impact these reconﬁgurations have from the perspectives of interested
parties.
The diaspora studies that we reviewed earlier foregrounded the distributed nature of productive
collectives and the relational dimensions of skills and human capital. These are fundamentals that
are important for renewed brain drain studies. However, the diaspora approach was also limited by
its own reinscribing of homogeneity – of culture and/or national interest – within its networks. This
is in contrast to wider diaspora scholarship, which is more likely to conceptualize diaspora “in
terms of hybridity, métissage or heterogeneity” (Braziel and Mannur, 2003: 6). Thinking about dis-
tributed human capital in such terms refers us to spatially unbounded processes of creativity, emer-
gence, (re-)combination and bricolage. Hybridity and heterogeneity – of objectives, interests,
organization and people – replace simple dichotomies of home/abroad, national/international and
loss/gain. Vectors of change forged by the dynamics of human capital, which mobilize knowledge,
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skill, learning and investment across particular material and institutional contexts, ultimately under-
pin emergent socio-economic innovation and development.
NOTES
1. See, for example, the discussions and references in the “brain drain” section of the Science and Develop-
ment Network website, at http://www.scidev.net
2. Boulding made his early contributions to the brain drain debate in the 1960s, but it was not until the 1980s
that he fully elaborated his evolutionary theory of economics. Evolutionary economics emerged in the dec-
ade of the 1980s as an alternative to the dominant neoclassical paradigm, particularly in relation to the
study of the economic dynamics induced by innovation processes and technical change. For example, Dop-
fer (2005: 17) reviews the main empirical axioms of what he calls “an evolutionary ontology”. Among
these axioms are: “the recognition of relations and connections”, that generate “associations” and therefore
“structures”, and the recognition of “existences as process”; a process is conceived as “structure in time”.
3. Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) point out that if ﬁnite instead of inﬁnitesimal shifts of labour are considered,
emigration will cause a loss to those left behind. However, depending of the size of the emigration and the
nature of the production function, this loss may still be very small.
4. Despite the acknowledgement of external effects, in the neoclassical tradition human capital units remain
fundamentally unrelated. The connection among them is only partially captured through the concept of
externalities. This concept simply reﬂects the idea that the market is not able to fully capture the value gen-
erated through social interactions, but does not permit us to address the nature of those interactions and of
the social value created.
5. According to Becker (1993 [1964]: 346), this explains why the brain drain of educated and skilled persons
almost invariably occurs from poorer to richer countries.
6. Grubel and Scott’s 1966 paper encouraged some critical reactions from scientists, published in a letters sec-
tion on the “Brain Drain Dilemma” in Science, 154(3752).
7. See http://www.raices.mincyt.gov.ar, http://www.chileglobal.org, http://www.ananet.org and http://www.ap-
ter.org. For a thorough review of the DKNs operating at the end of the 1990s, see Barré et al. (2003).
8. Global initiatives have also emerged, such as Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOK-
TEN), from the United Nations Development Programme.
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